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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the application of legal principles to professional sporting 
entities in the context of the Commerce Commission 's decision authorising the 
New Zealand Rugby Football Union player transfer arrangements. It analyses 
the approach taken by the Commission to claim jurisdiction over the player 
transfer arrangements. In particular, the paper examines the Commission 's 
formulation of the relevant markets, which were structured as markets to which 
the Commerce Act applies. Thus, the Commission's avoidance of the 'contract 
of service' exemption in section 2(1) of the Commerce Act by artificially 
constructing a market for the provision of services is scrutinised. Furthermore, 
the paper questions the Commission 's disregard for the section 44 exemptions, 
which would act to remove the NZRFU player transfer arrangements from the 
ambit of the Commerce Act. The Commission 's interpretation of the public 
benefit test is also examined. It is postulated that the narrow efficiency 
framework prescribed by the Commerce Commission may be inappropriate for 
professional sporting bodies. 
The paper also summarises the common law restraint of trade doctrine, which 
has been applied extensively by the Australian courts to restrictive practices in 
the professional sporting environment. The New Zealand Rugby Football Union 
player transfer arrangements are examined to determine whether the proposed 
system would survive challenge under the restraint of trade doctrine. Finally, the 
paper concludes that sporting administrative bodies must now ensure that any 
restrictive arrangements imposed on professional athletes comply with the 
Commerce Act and the common law restraint of trade doctrine. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes , bibliography and 
annexures) comprises approximately 14,709 words. 
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The business of sport and leisure is part health, part personal achievement, part 
entertainment and part national pride. New Zealand is a great sporting nation. 
We are one of the few nations where sport is a major part of the national 
character, and is valued and supported by the great majority. 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In September 1996, the New Zealand Rugby Football Union Incorporated 
(NZRFU) submitted an application for authorisation under section 58 of the 
Commerce Act 1986 to enter into and give effect to its proposed player transfer 
system. The system was to be implemented by the passing of regulations and 
the amendment of the NZRFU's rules. The proposed arrangements provided for 
the establishment of a transfer registration system for players and a requirement 
for provincial unions to negotiate a transfer fee. The principal characteristics of 
the system included the categorisation of players into various 'bands' of 
competency, a quota whereby provincial unions are restricted as to the number 
of players in each 'band' to be acquired each year, a transfer period and a 
maximum transfer fee payable to selling unions. 
The Commerce Commission delivered a decision authorising the rugby union 
player transfer arrangements.2 This determination is significant because it 
illustrates the Commission 's willingness to apply the Commerce Act to 
professional sporting organisations. In this respect, the Commission takes an 
approach that accords with its present 'neutralisation' policy whereby sporting 
bodies will be subject to identical procedures as any other commercial entity. 
However, it is arguable that the Commission has claimed jurisdiction over the 
1 Wilson Whineray, Chairman of the Hillary Commission for Recreation and Sport, The Hillary 
Commission's Summary Annual Report, 1994-1995, 4. 
2 Commerce Commission Decision No 281, 17 December 1996. 
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NZRFU player transfer arrangements despite contradictory provisions in the 
Commerce Act. Although the Rugby Union Players' Association did not 
expressly challenge the jurisdiction of the Commission to consider the 
arrangements, the investigative nature of the Commission suggests that they 
should have considered the exemption provisions contained in section 44 of the 
Commerce Act to ascertain whether jurisdiction could in fact be claimed. The 
failure of the Commerce Commission to consider the section 44 exemptions also 
raises the issue of the relevance of the common law restraint of trade doctrine. 
The Australian courts have frequently addressed restrictions upon players under 
this common law doctrine. The applicability of this doctrine to the NZRFU player 
transfer arrangements may be significant, as the common law doctrine takes 
into account factors which differ from those considered under the public benefit 
test prescribed by the Commerce Act. 
This paper will consider the applicability of competition laws to sporting entities 
in the context of the player transfer arrangements proposed by the NZRFU. 
Accordingly, Part II of the paper presents an overview of the professional rugby 
union environment, the proposed regulations and the Commerce Commission's 
final determination. Part Ill discusses the application of legal principles to 
sporting entities with particular emphasis on the Commerce Act 1986. Part IV 
discusses the exemption in the Commerce Act pertaining to contracts of service 
and the effect of this exception on market definition in the Commission 's 
determination. Part V of the paper outlines the 'public benefit' test while Part VI 
critiques the approach taken by the Commerce Commission in applying the test. 
Part VII outlines the common law restraint of trade doctrine and its relationship 
with the Commerce Act 1986. Part VI 11 considers the application of the restraint 
of trade doctrine to the NZRFU player transfer arrangements. Finally, a 
conclusion is reached as to the legitimacy of the Commission's approach to the 
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NZRFU player transfer arrangements and the suitability of the Commerce Act to 
deal with professional sporting organisations. 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE NZRFU PLAYER ARRANGEMENTS 
A. The Parties 
The New Zealand Rugby Football Union is the administrative body which 
governs the participants involved in rugby union throughout New Zealand. The 
NZRFU applied for authorisation under the Commerce Act 1986 to enter into 
and give effect to its proposed player transfer system. The system was to be 
implemented by the passing of regulations and the amendment of the NZRFU's 
rules. 
There are 27 provincial unions nationwide, which are independent incorporated 
societies affiliated to the NZRFU. Each union has teams playing in the Senior A 
National Provincial Championships (NPC) and NPC Development grades. In 
New Zealand, there are approximately 130,000 rugby union players of whom 
1,100 are directly affected by the NZRFU player regulations. As a result of the 
commencement of professional rugby, all Rugby Super 12 players, All Blacks 
and some Development players have contracts with , and receive remuneration 
from, the NZRFU. Many provincial unions also have contracts with NPC 
players, which vary significantly between unions, particularly in terms of 
remuneration.3 
The Rugby Union Player's Association (RUPA) is an incorporated society 
established in 1996 to represent the interests of New Zealand rugby union 
3 Player remuneration may be based on number of games played, fixed per-match fee , bonus 
payments for a win , or proportion of gate takings. 
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players. As an interested party, the RUPA appeared before the Commission 
and made submissions. Although the RUPA had no financially active members 
in November 1996, it was stated at the Conference that they represented the 
interests of over 85% of the players in the First Division of the NPC competition. 
The RUPA actively opposed the NZRFU's application for authorisation and took 
the Commerce Commission's decision on appeal to the High Court. However, it 
is notable that the RUPA did not challenge the jurisdiction of the Commission to 
examine the NZRFU regulations. Rather, the RUPA contended that the 
institution of the player transfer arrangements would contravene the Commerce 
Act and should be found illegal by the Commerce Commission . The RUPA also 
argued that the public benefit alleged to be delivered by the arrangements was 
insufficient to outweigh the lessening of competition so that the NZRFU should 
not be granted authorisation. The RUPA's decision to challenge the NZRFU 
player transfer arrangements under the Commerce Act illustrates the practical 
difficulties in pursuing a class action based on the common law restraint of trade 
doctrine. The infrequent use of the class action in New Zealand reflects the 
administrative costs associated with a class action and the restrictive attitude 
taken by the New Zealand judiciary to Rule 78 of the High Court Rules which 
governs the use of class actions in New Zealand.4 
The NZRFU have a number of prominent sponsors including Air New Zealand, 
Lion Nathan Ltd and Television New Zealand (TVNZ). With the development of 
the Rugby Super 12 competition in 1995, an exclusive agreement was signed 
with News Corporation Limited (News Corp) providing them with the rights to 
televise all rugby union matches played in New Zealand, South Africa and 
Australia for the next ten years. In return for television exclusivity, News Corp 
4 See R J Flowers Ltd v Burns [1987) 1 NZLR 260 where it was held that the consent of all parties 
is required even if pursuing a class action under the direction of the court. 
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agreed to pay a total of US$555 million to the rugby unions of South Africa, 
Australia and New Zealand over the next ten years. News Corp has 
subsequently on-sold some of these rights to local television networks such as 
Sky Network Television Limited which has further on-sold some of these rights 
to TVNZ. 
B. The Regulations 
Under the Regulations, rugby union players are split into a number of "bands".5 
These bands indicate the level of experience of the player and the competition in 
which the player has been most recently playing. Although the regulations have 
consequences for all levels of the sport, they only directly affect transferring 
players who fall within one of the bands and who will play in the acquiring 
provincial union's Senior A NPC team in that or any future year. 
There are three fundamental aspects of the Regulations that are relevant for the 
purposes of the Commerce Act 1986. 
1. The Quota System 
Each provincial union is restricted in the number of players from each band or 
grouping of bands that it may acquire in any year.6 The maximum number of 
transfers of band classified players that a provincial union may accept in any 
twelve month period is five. Within this total, an annual quota is also set for 
every specific band or grouping of bands. For most bands, the quota is set at 
two players. However, provincial unions can only acquire the services of one All 
Black per year. 
5 The pertinent bands are set out in Appendix A. 
6 See Appendix A. 
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Transfers above the quota can occur with the consent of the Player Transfer 
Review Committee on the basis that there has been an extraordinary and/or 
compelling change in the player's personal circumstances. This may include a 
change in employment, family circumstances, or an irretrievable breakdown in 
the relationship between a player and a provincial union. 
2. The Transfer Period 
Under the Regulations, the transfer of players falling within the specified bands 
can occur only in the period from 1 November to 30 November in each year. 
However, negotiations and agreements relating to transfer may take place at 
any time during the year. Transfers can occur outside the transfer period in 
circumstances where the Player Transfer Review Committee considers that 
there has been an extraordinary and/or compelling change in the player's 
personal circumstances. 
3. Development Compensation Payment 
The Regulations provide that whenever a banded player transfers between 
provincial unions, it is conditional on the payment of a transfer fee from the 
player's new provincial union to the prior provincial union. Provincial unions may 
negotiate as to the fee payable in respect of a particular player. The payment 
may be zero but it cannot exceed the maximum set for each band by the 
NZRFU. The maximum amounts were set following consultation with the 
provincial unions based on the agreed maximum value that the provincial unions 
place on the skills and experience of players at various levels.7 In the event that 
agreement cannot be reached as to the amount to be paid to the selling 
provincial union, there can be a transfer if, and only if, the player agrees to the 
transfer and the acquiring provincial union agrees to pay the maximum 
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applicable Development Compensation Payment to the selling provincial union. 
However, if the acquiring provincial union is not willing to pay the maximum fee 
for that band of player and no agreement can be reached on a lower or nil fee, 
no transfer will occur unless the Player Transfer Review Committee has 
jurisdiction to consider the matter on the basis that there has been an 
extraordinary and/or compelling change in the player's personal circumstances. 
During the authorisation process, the NZRFU submitted that the maximum 
values were not assessments of the financial value of the players but were 
compensation for a union's investment in that player's development. However, 
the Commerce Commission expressly decided that the payment was not based 
on the cost of player development but rather on the expected value of the 
player's services. This was illustrated by the fact that different maximum values 
apply to 'Star', 'Established' and 'Current' All Blacks, regardless of the fact that 
the same investment in development may have been made in each player. 
Therefore, the Commerce Commission concluded that although the primary 
purpose of the payment was to ensure compensation to the losing provincial 
union, the payment was, in effect, a transfer fee. The Commerce Commission, 
throughout its Determination, referred to the payment as a transfer fee. 
C. The Determination 
In a Determination dated 17 December 1996, the Commission formulated three 
markets that could potentially be affected by the regulations. These were: 
i. The market for player services in which players compete with each other to 
supply their skills or services to provincial unions and provincial unions 
compete with each other to acquire them; 
7 See Appendix A. 
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ii. The market for the rights to player services in which provincial unions 
compete with each other to buy and sell the rights to utilise the services of 
premier rugby union players; and 
iii. The market for sports entertainment services. 
The Commission found that the player transfer arrangements did not affect 
competition in the market for sports entertainment services. However, the 
Commission found that the quota and transfer system had the purpose and had 
or were likely to have the effect of lessening competition in the market for player 
services and the market for the rights to player services under section 27 of the 
Commerce Act. The Commission concluded that the Regulations would have, 
or would be likely to have, the combined effect of lessening competition in the 
said markets. The Commission also found that the maximum transfer fees 
constituted a price fixing arrangement under section 30 and thus were deemed 
to substantially lessen competition in the market for player services and the 
market for the rights to player services in terms of section 27. Finally, the quota 
system was found to be an arrangement or understanding with the purpose of 
preventing, restricting or limiting the supply of the rights to player services to, or 
the acquisition of player services from, the provincial unions and was an 
exclusionary provision under section 29 of the Commerce Act. Thus, the quota, 
transfer system and maximum transfer fee in combination were found to be anti-
competitive under the Commerce Act. 
Accordingly, the Commerce Commission was not satisfied that the Regulations 
would not result in a lessening of competition in terms of sections 27, 29 and 30 
of the Act and could then consider whether authorisation should be granted 
under the Act. The Commission determined that the public detriments arising 
from the lessening in competition from the Regulations were limited and mainly 
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included the cost of administering the arrangements and the erosion of player 
skills when transfer wishes were frustrated by the arrangements. Although the 
public benefits arising from the arrangement were also limited, the Commission 
found them to outweigh the corresponding detriments. The benefits arose from 
maintaining the value of overseas television rights, preserving the performance 
of representative teams, preserving sponsorship and maintaining inbound 
tourism associated with rugby. The Commission concluded that the benefit to 
the public which would in all the circumstances result, or be likely to result, from 
the Regulations outweighed the lessening in competition that would result, or be 
likely to result, from the Regulations. As a result, the Commission granted an 
authorisation for the NZRFU to enter into and give effect to the player transfer 
arrangements pursuant to sections 61 (6) and 61 (7) of the Act.8 
D. The Appeal 
Pursuant to section 91 of the Commerce Act, the RUPA appealed to the High 
Court against the Commerce Commission's determination. In particular, the 
RUPA objected to the Commission's application of the public benefit test and 
claimed that "there was no or no sufficient evidential basis to support the finding 
that any public benefits which might flow from the transfer regulations would 
outweigh the material detriments".9 In a judgment issued on 14 August 1997, 
Smellie J and Mr Gaire Blunt undertook a reasonably comprehensive 
examination of the benefits and detriments said to arise from the player transfer 
arrangements.10 Smellie J noted that the Commission took a fairly conservative 
approach in its assessment of the linkage between the benefits and the 
8 Despite being worded slightly differently, the test under section 61 (6) is essentially the same as 
that under section 61 (7) in that it requires the weighing of public benefits against the detriments 
flowing from the practice. See Re New Zealand Stock Exchange Commerce Commission Decision 
No 232, 10 May 1989, para 62. 
9 Rugby Union Players ' Association Inc v Commerce Commission Unreported, 14 August 1997, 
High Court, Auckland Registry, CL 2/97, 14. 
11 
Regulations. Additionally, the High Court stated that the Commerce 
Commission should monitor the application of the Regulations as the 
Commission could vary or revoke the authorisation if it finds it was misled, or 
there has been a material change of circumstances, or any condition upon which 
the authorisation was granted has not been complied with. The High Court 
dismissed the RUPA's appeal and upheld the Commission's determination 
granting an authorisation. 
Ill. APPLICATION OF LEGAL PRINCIPLES TO SPORTING 
ENTITIES 
Professional sports have traditionally been a social and legal soft spot, providing 
a haven for anti-competitive activities and contracts. The hesitant judicial 
application of legal principles to sporting bodies may be attributed to the public 
interest facilitated by certain anti-competitive measures or more likely, the 
subjective social desire to keep sport 'pure' and free from commercial and 
judicial realities. In the past, this has ensured a low salary structure and a virtual 
immunity for professional sporting procedures from legal challenges. However, 
it is not only the emotive character of sports that causes some difficulty in 
adapting legal theories to sports organisations. While considerations 
appropriate to trade and commerce are certainly relevant to the practices of a 
sporting organisation and its relationships with its employees, the additional 
importance of maintaining a marketable sporting competition adds a unique 
component to the application of law in this field. 
Advocates of restrictive practices in the sporting arena repeatedly argue in both 
restraint of trade and competition law cases that organised professional team 
10 Above n 9, 34-47. 
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sports are a unique industry that should not be subject to traditional legal 
principles. They assert that the competing clubs are mutually interdependent 
because they must cooperate to produce the game. 11 Contrary to normal 
business practice, the product generated by a sports contest, competition 
between teams, is fundamentally dependent upon the existence of competitors. 
In this respect, the health of each club depends on the health of the league. If 
the stronger clubs or teams use their resources to drive out their competitors, 
the whole league will suffer. 
The equalisation of competitive playing strengths between teams is commonly 
attained by controlling the distribution of player talent within the league by 
certain rules and procedures. These necessarily inhibit true competition within 
the player market and are restraints of trade. However, such rules may be 
adjudged as reasonably necessary to protect a team's investment in its players. 
The primary justification is that the lack of restriction may cause the equality of 
competition to decline because players would frequently jump from team to team 
and thereby destroy the team's existing harmony and coordination . Thus, the 
courts acknowledge that it is appropriate for rules to be implemented which help 
the weaker clubs in their competition with the stronger ones, keep the league 
evenly balanced and prevent the ultimate destruction of the entire league.12 
In recent times however, there has been a marked shift in basic attitude towards 
professional sports. The players, legislature, judiciary and the public are 
recognising that sports are 'big business'. This emerging awareness has been 
reflected in both Australia and New Zealand by judicial willingness to consider 
professional sports within the scope of the antitrust doctrine. The first Australian 
11 See Samuel R Pierce Jr "Organised Professional Team Sports and the Antitrust Laws" (1 958) 
43 Cornell Law Review 566. 
13 
case to consider the application of the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974
13 to 
a sporting body was the High Court judgement of Adamson v West Perth 
Football Club. 14 This case concerned the Club's refusal to grant Adamson 
clearance to play for another club. Adamson claimed that this behaviour 
contravened section 45(2) of the Trade Practices Act15 as the refusal had the 
effect of "substantially lessening competition". Although this claim was not 
upheld by the Federal Court, the High Court considered the issue of whether or 
not a sporting body should be deemed a "trading corporation" under section 4(1) 
and thus be subject to the Act. The majority held that even if no profits were 
distributed to individuals as shareholders, the competition between the two clubs 
was clearly an activity of commerce and not merely incidental to the promotion 
and encouragement of sport. Accordingly, Barwick CJ considered that "the 
presentation of a football match as a commercial venture for profit to the 
promoting body is an activity of trade".16 
Notwithstanding this early recognition of sporting bodies as a commercial entity, 
it was not until 1986 that the Australian Trade Practices Act was successfully 
applied in a sporting context. In Hughes v Western Australian Cricket 
Association lnc,17 the plaintiff successfully challenged the Cricket Council 's rule 
that precluded players from taking part in unregistered cricket matches under 
section 45(2) of the Trade Practices Act. This trend continued in the highly 
publicised case of News Ltd v Australian Rugby League, 18 which concerned an 
attempt by News Ltd to set up an alternative rugby league premiership to 
12 See Adamson v New South Wales Rugby League Ltd (1991) 103 ALR 319. 
13 Australian equivalent of the Commerce Act 1986 (NZ). 
14 (1979) 23 ALR 439. 
15 The New Zealand equivalent is section 27 of the Commerce Act 1986 which prohibits contracts, 
arrangements or understandings which have the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially 
lessening competition in a market. 
16 Adamson v West Perth Football Club; above n 14, 454. 
17 (1986) 69 ALR 660. 
18 (1996) ATPR 41 -466 (Federal Court) ; (1996) ATPR 45-521 (Full Federal Court). 
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compete directly with the Australian Rugby League (ARL). Although Burchett J 
conceptualised the ARL as a joint venture, which was essentially non-
commercial in nature, the Full Federal Court clearly decided that the ARL and its 
constituent clubs were engaged in trade and commerce rather than carrying on 
the virtuous activity of promoting rugby league. Accordingly, Justice Burchett's 
attempt to formulate a judicial "sporting exemption" was overruled in favour of an 
approach which ensured that all commercial laws, including the Trade Practices 
Act, applied to the ARL. 
In New Zealand, a similar trend has begun to emerge. In Re Speedway Control 
Board of New Zealand (lnc), 19 the Commerce Commission analysed competitor 
agreements and the incorporated rules of the Speedway Control Board which 
effectively prevented competitors from entering unauthorised race meetings. 
The Commission considered that these restrictions had the effect of 
substantially lessening competition in the market for the services of speedway 
competitors and were illegal under sections 27 and 29 of the Commerce Act 
1986. The Commission made it clear that the non-profit making nature of the 
organisation was not relevant for competition purposes. Additionally, the fact 
that its membership was voluntary and that the members of the body had a 
common interest was insufficient to remove the Speedway Control Board from 
the ambit of the Commerce Act. Thus, a clear message was conveyed to 
sporting bodies that they were considered to be no different from any other 
commercial entities under the Commerce Act 1986. 
It is submitted that the Commerce Commission's decision regarding the NZRFU 
player transfer arrangements accords with this modern approach. Although the 
Commission did not expressly discuss the applicability of the Commerce Act to 
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the NZRFU, it undoubtedly considered it to be a foregone conclusion that the 
NZRFU, as the national administrator of a professional sport, was subject to the 
Act. The revenue maximising nature of the competition and the vast marketing 
opportunities available to the NZRFU and its affiliated unions necessitates a 
realistic view of the professional rugby union environment. Thus, the approach 
taken by the Commerce Commission accords with the financial and commercial 
realities of modern sporting competitions and the nature of the competitive 
relationship existing between affiliated provincial unions for players, coaches, 
and supporters. 
IV. THE EXCEPTION FOR EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS AND THE 
EFFECT ON MARKET DEFINITION 
A. Australian Approach 
In Australia, the principal means of enforcement of the rights of restricted 
athletes has been by actions based upon the common law restraint of trade 
doctrine (discussed below). This is because attempts to bring actions under the 
Australian Trade Practices Act have to date been largely unsuccessful. 
Although professional sporting bodies may be considered "trading corporations" 
and thus be within the ambit of the Act, allegations of contravention of the Trade 
Practices Act have failed because the market in which clubs compete for the 
services of players is not, under the appropriate provisions, one to which the 
Trade Practices Act applies. Under similar provisions as the Commerce Act, the 
proscription on a corporation20 from giving effect to a provision which is likely to 
have the effect of substantially lessening competition under section 45 of the 
19 (1990) 2 NZBLC (Com) 104,521 . 
20 In New Zealand, it is a proscription on a person being defined in section 2(1 ) of the Commerce 
Act 1986 as "any association of persons whether incorporated or not". 
16 
Trade Practices Act21 is inapplicable to the club-player market. The Trade 
Practices Act defines competition for the purposes of section 45 as competition 
in any market where a corporation acquires services or would be likely to 
acquire services.22 Services are subsequently defined in section 4(1) of the 
Trade Practices Act23 so as to exclude performance of work under a contract of 
service.24 As the Australian courts have held that sports players fall within this 
exclusion, no redress is available under the Australian Trade Practices Act. 
In the Full Federal Court decision in Adamson v New South Wales Rugby 
Football League,25 the inapplicability of competition law to contracts relating to 
the employment of footballers was confirmed. However, Wilcox J expressed 
some dissatisfaction with this approach and stated:26 
From a policy viewpoint, some people might think it unfortunate that s45 does not apply to 
a case such as this . As I have pointed out, the internal draft rules undoubtedly have the 
purpose of restricting the supply of footballers' services (in the ordinary sense of that word) 
and the effect of substantially limiting competition in the marketplace for those services ... 
It is difficult to see what policy purpose is being achieved by leaving inviolate arrangements 
under which potential employers agree not to compete amongst themselves... It is 
certainly not in the interests of employees. They find themselves, uniquely so as far as the 
Act is concerned, having to suffer any collusion amongst those with whom they would 
negotiate . . . It seems to me that the present position is anomalous ... 
Effectively, the 'contract of service' exemption means that sporting bodies can 
disregard any consequences arising from competition law in respect of their 
21 The equivalent provision in the Commerce Act 1986 is section 27, which prohibits contracts, 
arrangements or understandings that substantially lessen competition in a market. 
22 Section 3(1 A) of the Commerce Act 1986 provides that "Every reference in this Act ... to the 
term "market" is a reference to a market in New Zealand for goods or services". 
23 The New Zealand equivalent is section 2(1) of the Commerce Act 1986. 
24 It is important to distinguish between a contract of service and a contract for services. The 
relationship between an employer and an employee is founded on a contract of service and is 
commonly referred to as an employment contract. Conversely, an independent contractor is 
engaged in a contract for the provision of services made between the principal and the contractor. 
25 Above n 12. 
26 Above n 12, 338. 
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dealings with players. It is to be noted however, that players may seek redress 
under the common law restraint of trade doctrine. Certainly, this common law 
doctrine allows player interests to be considered in a manner not possible under 
competition law (discussed below). With all due respect to Wilcox J, it is surely 
arguable that a legitimate policy purpose was achieved by removing 
employment contracts from the ambit of antitrust law. Presumably, the ancient 
and well-developed doctrine of restraint of trade was seen to be sufficient to deal 
with restrictions upon player services. Indeed, the plethora of Australian 
restraint of trade cases holding player restrictions to be unreasonable is perhaps 
sufficient to illustrate the competence of the common law to deal with such 
restrictions.27 Thus, it is unlikely that players must "suffer any collusion amongst 
those with whom they would negotiate" as the restraint of trade doctrine affords 
a potential remedy for disadvantaged players. 
Nonetheless, News Ltd provides an illustration of the application of the 
Australian Trade Practices Act notwithstanding the exemption for employment 
contracts. At trial, Burchett J held that there was no competition for the services 
of premiership players because these players were employees.28 However, the 
Full Federal Court reasoned that as the clubs were free in the future to engage 
players under contracts for services, they could be and were likely to be, in 
competition for these services. The Court stated that:29 
In these circumstances, it seems to us that in the competition and rivalry between clubs for 
premier players there was a real chance or possibility that there could be competition to 
engage players otherwise than under a contract of service. It thus follows that, at the time 
the commitment agreements and loyalty agreements were executed, the clubs were likely 
to be in competition for the 'services' of premier players (emphasis added). 
27 See Adamson v West Perth Football Club (1979) 27 ALR 475; Hall v VFL & Clarke [1982] VR 
62; Buckley v Tutty (1971) 125 CLR 353. 
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It is submitted that the Full Federal Court has taken a dubious approach in 
avoiding the exemption for a contract of service by artificially constructing a 
market for player services. The Court created a market for the supply and 
acquisition of players under contracts for the provision of services although no 
such transaction had actually occurred. Thus, the Court took a rather cavalier 
attitude to the actual form of the player contracts and effectively encouraged a 
significant widening in the Act to include services under a contract of 
employment. On the narrowest interpretation of this approach, wherever the 
parties are free to adopt a contract for services, there would be scope for 
potential competition for services under such contracts, and competition claims 
could arise. 
B. New Zealand Approach 
Like the Australian Trade Practices Act, section 2(1) of the Commerce Act 
defines services as excluding the performance of work under a contract of 
service. The restrictive trade practices provisions in the Commerce Act refer to 
either services or competition in a market. A market is defined in section 3(1 A) 
of the Commerce Act as "a market in New Zealand for goods or services". 
Thus, the prohibitions in Part II will not apply to employment contracts. 
Additionally, sections 44(1)(c) and 44(1)(f) exempt certain contracts from Part II 
of the Commerce Act. Section 44(1 )(c) exempts: 
[T]he entering into of a contract of service or a contract for the provision of services in so 
far as it contains a provision by which a person .. . agrees to accept restrictions as to the 
work, whether as an employee or otherwise, in which that person may engage during, or 
after the termination of, the contract (emphasis added). 
Section 44(1 )(f) exempts: 
28 Above n 18, 41 ,699 (Federal Court) 
[T]he entering into of a contract, or arrangement, or arriving at an understanding in so far 
as it contains a provision that relates to the remuneration , conditions of employment, hours 
of work, or working conditions of employees. 
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In order to avoid the application of the 'contract of service' exemption to the 
NZRFU player contracts, the Commerce Commission indulged in some rather 
creative reasoning with regard to market definition. The market for player 
services and the market for the rights to player services will be discussed in turn. 
1. Market for player services 
In its draft determination regarding the NZRFU player transfer arrangements, the 
Commission held that there was no market for player services as section 2(1) 
excluded the player contracts. However, in its final determination, the 
Commission concluded that there was a market for player services. It stated:
30 
The Commission will not make a categoric determination of this issue but will proceed on 
the basis that some of the contracts might be contracts for services or that the market for 
player services might develop in such a way as to cause many contracts to be construed 
as contracts for services. 
In this aspect of its decision, the Commerce Commission followed the 
questionable approach taken by the Australian Federal Court in News Ltd to 
avoid the application of the 'contract of service' exemption. On appeal, the High 
Court discussed the Commerce Commission's approach as follows:31 
... the Commission was of the view, following the full Federal Court of Australia, that there 
was a real possibility that there could be competition to engage persons otherwise than 
under a contract of service in the narrowly defined sense. Thus, there is clearly room for 
the Commission's view that there could be a market for the rights to player services, at 
29 Above n 18, 42,654 (Full Federal Court) . 
30 Above n 2, 21. 
31 Above n 9, 50. 
least to the extent that some players in the market may be found to be independent 
contractors. 
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Unfortunately, Smellie J was not prepared to rule on this point and preferred to 
leave it for another occasion when the issue "is squarely before the Court and 
specifically addressed in the submissions of counsel".32 
As discussed above in the Australian context, the manipulation of the market for 
player services by formulating potential transactions involving contracts for 
services subverts the true intention of the Act in exempting employment 
contracts from its ambit. It is notable that even if some contracts for the 
provision of services were found to exist, authorisation of the player transfer 
arrangements could not be permitted to the extent that it applies to contracts of 
services, as section 2(1) expressly exempts employment contracts from the 
Commerce Act. Additionally, the Commission's analysis of the market for player 
services proceeds on the assumption that the NZRFU is free to engage players 
either under a contract for the provision of services or an employment contract. 
However, the characterisation of any particular contract as a contract of service 
or contract for services is a matter of substance rather than form. Thus, the 
NZRFU may not choose to structure a player contract as a contract for services 
if, as a matter of construction, it bears the hallmarks of an employment contract. 
The employee/independent contractor distinction in relation to professional 
rugby union players has always been a contentious issue. A long-running 
dispute exists between the All Black players and the Inland Revenue 
Department (IRD) as to the proper characterisation of the player contracts. The 
IRD argues that the All Blacks are employees while the All Blacks have been 
attempting to conduct their affairs as if they were independent contractors. 
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While a decision is still pending, it seems clear that the characterisation of player 
contracts will depend upon the rights and obligations contained within, and not 
the label attached by the parties. This accords with the leading case of TNT v 
Cunningham where Cooke P stated that:33 
When the terms of a contract are fully set out in writing which is not a sham, the answer to 
the question of the nature of the contract must depend on an analysis of the rights and 
obligations so defined. 
Cooke P also formulated the test to be adopted in distinguishing between 
independent contractors and employees. The test requires that the following 
question be asked:34 
Is the person who has engaged himself to perform these services performing them as a 
person in business on his own account? If the answer to that question is "yes", then the 
contract is a contract for services. If the answer is "no", then the contract is a contract of 
service. 
In determining this question, a central issue will always be the degree of control 
over the player. Thus, the terms of a player's contract as a whole must be 
examined, with due consideration given to the issue of control, in order to 
determine whether the player is an employee or an independent contractor. 
Various elements of the NZRFU player contracts point to a high degree of 
control being exercised by the NZRFU. These characteristics include the 
obligation for players to maintain their fitness, attend team meetings, and 
maintain a high standard of behaviour. Additionally, players have little 
opportunity to supply their own equipment and it is the responsibility of the 
NZRFU or provincial unions to provide for insurance. 
32 Above n 9, 50. 
33 [1993) 1 ERNZ 695, 701. 
34 Above n 33, 737. 
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Following the TNT judgment and having assessed the rights and obligations 
such as those above, the degree of control is such that the NZRFU player 
contracts are likely to be classified as contracts of service as specified in section 
2(1) of the Commerce Act. Accordingly, the NZRFU player contracts are of an 
employment nature and the NZRFU cannot choose to act in such a way as "to 
cause many contracts to be construed as contracts for services". Therefore, the 
Commission 's determination that the NZRFU may, in the future, choose to 
engage players under a contract for services rests on the erroneous assumption 
that the NZRFU can structure their player contracts as a contract for the 
provision of services. Effectively, the actual substance of the existing player 
contracts dictates that the market for player services be exempt from the 
Commerce Act. 
Additionally, sections 44(1 )(c) and 44(1 )(f) of the Commerce Act exempt 
contracts of service and contracts for services from Part 11 of the Act in so far as 
they relate to work restrictions and employment conditions. In accordance with 
section 44(1 )(c), the NZRFU player transfer arrangements contain restrictions as 
to the work that a player may engage in, whether the player is an employee or 
an independent contractor and are thus exempt from Part 11 of the Act. Section 
44(1 )(f) also prevents the application of Part 11 to the NZRFU player transfer 
arrangements as they constitute the entering into of an arrangement which 
relates to the players' conditions of employment. Although it is understandable 
that Smellie J chose not to address the section 44 exemptions as the issue was 
not expressly pleaded before the Court, it seems that the Commission neglected 
to consider these exceptions and claimed jurisdiction in the face of clearly 
contradictory provisions in the Commerce Act. 
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2. Market for the rights to player services 
In addition to the characterisation of player contracts, the Commission 
formulated an alternative market for the purposes of analysing the effect of the 
Regulations. This was defined as the market for the rights to player services or 
alternatively the club-to-club market. This definition removed the need to 
discuss the 'contract of service' exemption as the players were not directly 
considered in this market. Additionally, the market formulation may have been 
an attempt by the Commerce Commission to avoid the application of the section 
44 exemptions. 
The market for the rights to player services was a market for the buying and 
selling between provincial unions of the rights to utilise the services of premier 
rugby union players. These rights "are to be provided, granted, or conferred in 
trade" and therefore are "services" within section 2(1) of the Commerce Act. 
Thus, the Commission attempted an alternative means of avoiding the 
application of the 'contract of service' exemption in section 2(1) by artificially 
redefining the market as a market which is recognised by the Act. By virtue of 
the market definition devised by the Commission, it is likely that section 44(1 )(c) 
would not render the Act inapplicable in respect of the market for rights to player 
services as the clubs do not enter into contracts of service or contracts for 
services between themselves. Therefore, at the club-club level, the clubs have 
not entered into contracts containing a provision by which a person agrees to 
accept restrictions as to the work "in which that person may engage".
35 
Although the affected players agree to comply with the NZRFU rules and thus, 
the player transfer arrangements, the player contracts are not directly 
considered in the market for the rights to player services. However, section 
35 It is to be noted that this result is a direct consequence of the Commission 's artificial market 
definition. 
LAW llBR 'l '? 
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44(1 )(f) would act to exempt the market for the rights to player services in the 
same manner as the club-player market. The NZRFU player transfer system 
would constitute an arrangement between provincial clubs and contain a 
provision that "relates" to the conditions of employment of the players, thus 
fulfilling the requirements of section 44(1 )(f). Accordingly, it seems that the 
Commission has not considered the exemptions contained in section 44 which 
would act to exempt the player transfer arrangements from Part 11 of the Act and 
thus place them outside the Commission 's jurisdiction. 
The Commerce Commission's decision authorising the NZRFU's proposed 
player transfer arrangements contains some rather doubtful reasoning in order 
to claim jurisdiction under the Commerce Act. The Commission artificially 
redefined the market to sidestep the 'contract of service' exemption in section 
2(1) of the Act and reach the desired result. However, the lack of regard given 
to the section 44 exceptions resulted in jurisdiction being claimed over a 
situation which Parliament plainly anticipated would be dealt with under the 
common law restraint of trade doctrine. 
It is to be noted that common law restraint of trade principles are expressly 
preserved under section 7(1) of the Commerce Act, which provides that the 
restraint of trade doctrine will apply to restrictive arrangements, to the extent that 
it is not inconsistent with the Commerce Act. The rationale for the preservation 
of the restraint of trade doctrine becomes clear when the exemptions in section 
44 are considered. The type of transactions that are exempted from Part II 
through the operation of section 44, are situations that have been traditionally 
protected by the common law restraint of trade doctrine. It seems that 
Parliament has made a clear policy decision to ensure that these typical restraint 
of trade situations are protected solely under the common law doctrine. An 
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article by John Feil, General Manager of the Commerce Commission, is perhaps 
indicative of the Commission's disregard for the exemptions contained in section 
44.36 Although making direct reference to the preservation of the restraint of 
trade doctrine under section 7 of the Commerce Act, Feil makes no mention of 
section 44. Therefore, the Commission's oversight of the section 44 exemptions 
serves to directly contradict Parliament's true intention in excluding these 
situations from the Commerce Act. 
V. THE PUBLIC BENEFIT TEST 
A. Authorisation under the Commerce Act 1986 
Parties to potentially anti-competitive and illegal trade practices can obtain 
immunisation from potential actions under the Commerce Act by applying to the 
Commerce Commission for authorisation. Authorisation of illegal behaviour 
requires the applicant to satisfy the Commission that the public benefit arising 
from the otherwise illegal practice outweighs the anti-competitive harm caused 
or likely to be caused. Thus, anti-competitive arrangements under section 27 
and exclusionary arrangements under section 29 may be immune from the 
ambit of the Act if the public benefit test is satisfied. The test for authorisation of 
section 27 practices is found in section 61 (6) which provides that the 
Commission shall not grant an authorisation unless it is satisfied that: 
The entering into of the contract or arrangement or the arriving at the understanding ... will 
in all the circumstances result, or be likely to result, in a benefit to the public which would 
outweigh the lessening in competition that would result or would be likely to result or is 
deemed to result therefrom. 
Section 61 (6A) was added in 1996 to make it clear that the lessening of 
competition in section 61 (6) does not have to be substantial before the 
36 John Feil "Competition and Sport" [1997] NZLJ 146. 
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Commission has jurisdiction to grant authorisation.
37 The test for authorisation 
of section 29 practices is found in section 61 (7) which provides that the 
Commission shall not grant an authorisation unless it is satisfied that: 
The entering into of the contract or arrangement or the arriving at the understanding ... will 
in all the circumstances result, or be likely to result, in such a benefit to the public that -
(c) The contract or arrangement or understanding should be permitted to be entered into or 
arrived at. 
Although section 61 (7) does not expressly require a weighing of public benefit 
against competitive detriment, Re New Zealand Stock Exchange interpreted 
"such a benefit to the public" as "a net or overall benefit after any detriment to 
the public has been taken into account" and thus established a requirement to 
balance public benefits against any public detriments flowing from the practice in 
a similar manner to section 61 (6). 38 
B. Public Benefit 
The word 'public benefit' is not defined in the Act. Initially, the Commission 
appeared to consider a wide range of various socio-political and non-efficiency 
matters. Re Weddel Crown Corporation Ltcf
9 was the first opportunity to 
consider the phrase and the Commerce Commission was careful to take a broad 
approach. The Commission stated:40
 
The Act is worded broadly and there appears to be no limitation as to the nature of the 
public benefit which may be claimed . . . [a] benefit is something of value to the public. 
The Weddel case concerned an application for authorisation of a collective 
agreement by a group of meat companies jointly facilitating the closure of meat 
37 Section 61 (SA) provides that "For the purposes of subsection (6) of this section, a lessening in 
competition includes a lessening in competition that is not substantial". 
38 Commerce Commission Decision No 232, 10 May 1989, para 62. 
39 (1987) 1 NZBLC (Com) 104,200. 
27 
works. The Commission considered the benefit of a strengthened position in 
international markets to the farming industry and the New Zealand economy. 
Following this approach, numerous other cases have taken into account a 
variety of non-economic and social benefits including enhanced job security,
41 
improved road safety,42 better consumer information,43 and community 
harmony.44 
Recently however, the Chicago school's theory of competition policy has 
influenced the drafters and interpreters of the Act. The idea that public benefit 
equates to efficiency has effectively replaced the traditional view that 
competition law is concerned with economic, social , moral and political 
concerns. Acceptance of the Chicago school's theory culminated in the 1990 
insertion of section 3A which directs the Commission to "have regard to any 
efficiencies that the Commission considers will result, or will be likely to result, 
from that conduct". Although judicial application of the public benefit test 
continues to be somewhat unsystematic and uncertain, it seems clear that the 
"efficiency gains and losses associated with a merger or practice are the 
principal considerations in the application of the Public Benefit Test".
45 
Accordingly, in their 1993 review of the Commerce Act, Cabinet clearly indicated 
that productive, allocative and dynamic efficiencies should be regarded as the 
principal elements of the public benefit test.46 However, perhaps the clearest 
indication of the Commerce Commission's restrictive approach is to be found in 
40 Above 39, 104,213. 
41 Re Amcor Ltd-New Zealand Forest Products Ltd (1987) 1 NZBLC (Com) 104,233. 
42 Re Fletcher Challenge Ltd-New Zealand Forest Products Ltd (1988) 1 NZBLC (Com) 104,283, 
104,308. 
43 Re Life Underwriters Association of New Zealand Inc Commerce Commission Decision No 233, 
15 December 1988, para 69. 
44 Re New Zealand Cooperative Dairy Co Ltd/Waikato Valley Cooperative Dairies Ltd (1991) 2 
NZBLC (Com) 104,529. 
45 Ministry of Commerce "Review of the Commerce Act" Final Document, 1993. 
46 The paper recommended "amending section 3A of the Act to reflect that in assessing 
applications for the authorisation of anticompetitive mergers and practices : A the consideration of 
productive, allocative and dynamic efficiency will be the principal element of the analys is" 
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its 1994 guidelines, which were designed to "assist present and future 
Commission members to apply sound and consistent principles in reaching 
authorisation decisions, and to assist the business community to have a well-
focused input into those decisions".47 In accordance with the Cabinet review of 
the Act, the guidelines appear to focus heavily on efficiencies as the principal 
benefit, with a strong presumption favouring economic efficiency. Certainly, the 
gains listed as examples in the guidelines have a strong efficiency basis, 
including benefits such as economies of scale, economies of scope, better 
utilisation of existing capacity and cost reductions. 
In practice, the weight attached to any public benefit or detriment depends upon 
the opinion of the Commission as to the significance of the projected benefit or 
detriment, given all the circumstances surrounding an application. In Telecom 
Corporation of New Zealand Ltd/The Crown, the Commission succinctly 
summarised the point in the following terms:48 
Neither detriments nor benefits are easy to quantify ... In the end, however, uncertain and 
incomplete dollar values are not the only items to be weighed. There are unquantified but 
nevertheless real changes in outcomes, and qualitative factors, which must also be taken 
into account. The Commission must, as a matter of judgement, reach a view on the 
relative weighting to give to all of the various competitive detriments and public benefits 
identified as relevant to its decision, and make that judgement accordingly. 
C. Public Benefit in the Sporting Context 
The government acknowledges that sporting associations have a valuable public 
function. This public function has been frequently recognised by the 
47 Commerce Commission "Guidelines to the Analysis of Publ ic Benefi ts and Detriments in the 
Context of the Commerce Act" October 1994, 2. 
48 Commission Decision No 254, 17 October 1990; cited with approval by the High Court in The 
New Zealand Cooperative Dairy Co Ltdv Commerce Commission [1992] 1 NZLR 601 . 
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government in the form of promotion of sporting bodies via funding and tax 
exemptions. In a Department of Internal Affairs draft discussion document 
concerning the development of government policy on sport and physical 
recreation, it was expressly recognised that "[s]port and physical recreation have 
wide ranging social and economic impacts on New Zealand".49 In the document, 
various beneficial outcomes were recognised as flowing directly from sport. 
These include: 
i. Sport and recreation as an integral part of our national identity; 
ii. Strong communities and a variety of social policy goals ; 
iii. Health benefits;50 and 
iv. Crime prevention.51 
These reports indicate that sport may provide social and economic gains to the 
community, which are 'public' in the sense they are externalities. The 
incorporation of these social and community considerations into the public 
benefit test seems unlikely, especially as many sports-related benefits and 
detriments are difficult to quantify or measure. However, the Commission's 
public benefit guidelines expressly address the treatment of benefits that are not 
readily measurable in monetary terms. The guidelines place these intangible 
improvements within an efficiency paradigm :52 
"Intangible" improvements with respect to the general wellbeing of New Zealanders - eg 
health (physical and mental) and environment (air, water, noise, visual pollution, 
preservation of endangered species) - can be considered as either increased outputs or 
49 Department of Internal Affairs "A New Zealand Government Policy for Sport and Recreation: A 
Discussion Document" 18 June 1996, 1. 
50 Statistically it has been proven that an increase of 10% in the number of physically active adults 
would provide $48 million in health care savings per year and reduce the risks of obesity, high 
blood pressure and cardiovascular disease; See ''The Business of Sport and Leisure: The 
Economic and Social Impact of Sport and Leisure in New Zealand" Business and Economic 
Research Limited, April 1993, 43. 
51 This benefit illustrates the difficulty in quantifying and proving the utility of sport as the report 
was unable to provide hard data to prove this outcome occurs. However, note Lord Denning's 
l~dicial notice of the inherent value of sport in Miller v Jackson [1977] 3 All ER 338, 340-341 . 
Above n 47, 10. 
reduced inputs and compared with total changes in inputs and outputs to see whether an 
"efficiency improvement" has been achieved. 
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Notwithstanding this acknowledgment of "intangible" benefits within the 
efficiency framework, it appears that the Commission will not seriously consider 
the non-economic and non-efficiency issues that arise in the sporting context 
under the public benefit test, particularly in light of the uncertain character of 
some of the benefits. In a practical sense, any social or community 
consequences will be deemed irrelevant unless they have a tangible efficiency 
element. 
Therefore, while it is true that the increasingly commercial nature of sporting 
organisations appears to justify their amenability to competition laws, closer 
examination reveals that they may be distinguishable from other commercial 
entities as they impart social and community benefits to society. Unfortunately, 
the 'public benefit test', as interpreted by the Commerce Commission, does not 
allow these non-economic and non-efficiency benefits to be balanced against 
anti-competitive behaviour. Consequently, the Commission is unwilling to 
consider these positive externalities when applying the authorisation procedures 
to sporting bodies. Additionally, the intangible and uncertain nature of these 
outcomes means that the Commerce Commission, and indeed the New Zealand 
courts, cannot easily consider these gains in the context of the public benefit 
test. 
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VI. THE PUBLIC BENEFIT TEST AS APPLIED IN THE NZRFU 
DECISION 
A. The Counterfactual 
In its decision, the Commerce Commission noted that the "extent to which 
competition is reduced, and the amount of detriments flowing therefrom, are to 
be gauged against the counterfactual scenario".53 The counterfactual is 
essentially a benchmark against which the Commission measures the likely 
competitive effects and public benefits. The formulation of a counterfactual 
allows the Commission to make a 'with' and 'without' comparison in a forward-
looking manner. The Commission's public benefit guidelines state that:54 
[T]he gain that is to be assessed is the difference between two hypothetical futures - one 
with the acquisition or practice, one without it - and not the difference between the present 
and the future . 
The Commission does not make a "before" and "after" comparison. This 
ensures that the alleged public benefits are dependent on the restrictive trade 
practice and would not occur in its absence. Thus, the counterfactual scenario 
chosen by the Commission has a significant effect upon the application of the 
public benefit test. In Electricity Market Company Ltd,
55 the Commerce 
Commission stated that:56 
The counterfactual is not necessarily the arrangement which might be preferred by the 
Commission or by others with an interest in the industry. The Commission does not have 
the mandate, nor the expertise to be the market designer. The counterfactual is simply the 
Commission's pragmatic and commercial assessment of what is likely to occur in the 
absence of the proposed arrangement. 
53 Above n 2, 63. 
54 Above n 47, 8. 
55 Commerce Commission Decision No 280, 13 September 1996. 
56 Above n 55, 11 . 
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In its application, the NZRFU proposed two alternative counterfactuals. Firstly, 
the NZRFU suggested a continuation of the moratorium on player transfers.57
 
Secondly, a system in which there is unrestricted transfer of rugby players 
between provincial unions was proposed, subject to contractual arrangements 
that the players have with their provincial unions.58 In accordance with the latter 
submission, the RUPA also proposed an unrestricted transfer market in which 
players could transfer freely subject to contracts of short-term duration.59 
In its determination, the Commission rejected all proposed counterfactual 
scenarios. Instead, the Commission formulated a counterfactual whereby a 
formalised system, administered by the NZRFU, would still be established to 
deal with player transfers. The counterfactual adopted by the Commission 
envisaged a transfer registration system and a requirement for provincial unions 
to negotiate a transfer fee, but without any restrictions in terms of a quota 
system, time period restriction , or cap on the transfer fee. The Commission 
considered that a number of factors indicated that some regulation of player 
transfers would be likely in the absence of the proposed regulations. These 
considerations included the fact that overseas research suggested that most 
sporting leagues regulate player transfers in some form and that several 
provincial unions indicated that an unregulated transfer system would not 
achieve the objective of an even, attractive competition. 
57 Prior to the NZRFU's application for authorisation, a moratorium was imposed whereby the 
provincial unions agreed not to negotiate for the movement of players between provincial unions 
over the 1995 and 1996 rugby union seasons. The NZRFU submitted that the moratorium was set 
in place to allow the NZRFU, provincial unions and players to adjust to the rapid transformation of 
rugby union from an amateur to a professional sport and was intended to create total prohibition 
on player transfers. 
58 The NZRFU submitted that the player contracts with provincial unions would be long term 
because of the uncertainty as to a player's future development or to ensure a return on a 
~rovincial union's investment in a player's train ing. 
9 The RUPA submitted that the player contracts would be predominantly short term due to the 
quasi-amateur nature of the NPC competition and the potential application of the restraint of trade 
doctrine. 
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On appeal to the High Court, the RUPA sought leave to challenge the 
counterfactual adopted by the Commission and stated that "in considering the 
question as to whether the claimed public benefits would flow from the transfer 
system, the Commission used a counterfactual which was not a pragmatically 
and commercially likely market in the absence of the Regulations".60 
Notwithstanding early comments by the NZRFU to the effect that it would not 
attempt to establish a market such as that envisaged by the Commission's 
counterfactual, the High Court nevertheless accepted later submissions by the 
NZRFU which supported the Commission's proposed counterfactual. 
Accordingly, the High Court was not persuaded that the Commission had 
chosen the wrong counterfactual. 
B. Economic Efficiency 
In its determination, the Commerce Commission expressly acknowledged that 
the focus of the public benefit test is economic efficiency.61 The Commission 
considered that:62 
[A] public benefit is any gain and a detriment is any loss, to the public of New Zealand, with 
an emphasis on gains and losses being measured in terms of economic efficiency. 
However, changes in the distribution of income, where one person gains while the other 
simultaneously loses, are generally not included either as a benefit or a detriment. 
While this approach accords with the Commission guidelines and past 
decisions, it may not accord with the intentions of parliament (discussed below). 
Certainly, it is in direct contrast to the common law restraint of trade doctrine, 
which considers whether the restraint is reasonable in the interests of the parties 
60 Above n 9, 16. 
61 Above n 2, 62. 
62 Above n 2, 63. 
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and the public. The restraint of trade doctrine emphasises the freedom of the 
individual to practice his or her trade as he or she pleases and enables the court 
to consider player interests in the course of its assessment. However, the 
Commission's interpretation of the public benefit test under the Commerce Act 
necessitates a rigid framework and does not allow this type of analysis to take 
place. Although an emphasis on unrestrained competition , rather than 
efficiency, has certain distributional consequences and would ultimately benefit 
the players, the efficiency framework adopted by the Commission ensures an 
approach whereby the allocation of resources and the interests of the restricted 
players are deemed immaterial. The Commission reinforces this view by 
emphasising the need for quantification of benefits and detriments wherever 
possible. This manner of application means that intangible and social benefits 
will be considered irrelevant or alternatively, will be given little weight in terms of 
the balancing exercise. 
C. Detriments 
The Commission found that the quota directly constrained the total number of 
players per year that a provincial union is able to acquire, and within that total , 
the number of players within the different bands that can be acquired. In 
addition, it concluded that the time period limitation for transfers could act as a 
further restraint, in that transfers are restricted to taking place within only one 
month of the year. Surprisingly, the Commission did not expressly consider the 
detriments arising from the implementation of a transfer fee arrangement. 
In its determination, the Commission found the following detriments were likely 
to be caused by the restrictive elements of the player transfer system: 
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)- Allocative Efficiency.63 Mutually beneficial trades may be prevented or 
delayed because players could not be traded in a free market whereby 
acquiring provincial unions value their services more highly than selling 
provincial unions. Thus, players may not be allocated to their most valued 
employment. An attempt at quantification was made whereby the economic 
loss was calculated as $62,000 in the first year and $13,000 thereafter. 
64 
However, it is noted that these figures are based on assumptions of price 
elasticity, average transfer fees and the number of transfers likely to be 
prevented each year. These assumptions create substantial uncertainty in 
terms of the quantification process, particularly when the professional rugby 
union environment is so new to New Zealand. 
)- Productive Efficiency. 65 The Commerce Commission concluded that any 
bargaining costs would not increase as a result of the Regulations. 
Therefore, productive inefficiencies consisted of minimal administrative and 
policing costs. 
)- Maintenance of player skill levels. The Regulations are effectively designed 
to limit the number of player transfers. Thus, it is likely that some players 
may not be able to transfer to provincial unions that value them and may 
become disgruntled. As a result, these players may perform less well or 
become discontent, resulting in skill erosion. Similarly, the skills of emerging 
players may be developed less rapidly because they are relegated to 
reserve duties and yet be unable to transfer because their provincial unions 
wish to retain them for 'back-up' purposes. This detriment may be termed as 
loss of asset value due to the underemployment of players. 
63 This refers to the optimum method of allocating available resources. 
64 The moratorium on player transfers in 1996/1997 season means that more transfers would 
~resumably be prevented in the first year of the regulations than any year following. 
5 This refers to production costs in terms of total output ie producing the most output at the least 
cost. 
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~ Innovative Efficiency.66 The RUPA suggested that the transfer period might 
diminish the incentive for unions to be innovative in terms of employment 
conditions and remuneration. However, the Commission discounted this 
potential detriment as minimal. 
The Commerce Commission concluded that the overall detriments flowing from 
the Regulations were of limited size. 
D. Benefits 
The NZRFU formulated three founding principles in respect of the Regulations. 
These are as follows: 
1 . Investment in ''grass roots" development 
The player transfer system rewards individual unions for developing young 
local players and provides an incentive for unions to invest in grass roots 
rugby. 
2. A players' market 
The transfer market is player-driven. Players retain control of where they will 
play their rugby. No player can be compelled to transfer and no player can 
be prevented from transferring by his union. 
3. Competitive rugby 
The transfer system will encourage even teams and competitive rugby in 
New Zealand. It protects the NZRFU's player strength by restricting the 
number of players that can move to a union. 
The NZRFU submitted that the promotion of a more 'even' NPC competition, 
player development and team stability would generate certain direct and indirect 
public benefits. These linkages were considered by the Commission in turn: 
66 Frequently referred to as dynamic efficiency, th is refers to progress in technology and 
innovation. 
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~ Promotion of a more 'even' NPC competition. Extensive evidence was 
presented to the Commission indicating that an unbalanced league causes 
audiences to lose interest and attendances to fall. Thus, on numerous 
occasions, the courts have recognised that a legitimate aim of sporting 
organisations is competitive balance in teams. A professional sports league 
has an incentive to preserve uncertainty of outcome by ensuring the teams 
maintain equal playing strengths, in order to maintain popularity and financial 
viability. However, it is to be noted that competitive balance may be sought 
in a variety of ways including player transfer controls, collective bargaining 
and revenue sharing. Moreover, overseas studies have indicated that labour 
controls are an imperfect mechanism for achieving league balance. 
The Commission accepted that the scope for the NZRFU to restrict transfers 
was limited because of the semi-amateur nature of rugby union in New 
Zealand. However, it was possible that the NPC would become more 
uneven in the absence of regulation. The Commission noted that:67 
(l]t seems likely that [the regulations) will have some effect, in terms of avoiding the 
excesses which might eventuate in a free market where provincial unions could 
compete for players to stay one step ahead of the others ... the Commission accepts 
that there is a linkage between the Regulations and the evenness of the NPC 
competition , but believes the strength of the linkage is low. 
This conclusion may be challenged, as the Commerce Commission appears 
to be making a comparison between the player transfer market with the 
proposed regulations, and a free market as anticipated by the NZRFU and 
the RUPA. However, the counterfactual scenario formulated by the 
Commission anticipates the imposition of a regulatory regime administered 
by the NZRFU, albeit without the anticompetitive elements at issue. 
38 
Therefore, the correct comparison to be made by the Commerce 
Commission is between the market with the proposed Regulations in place 
and the market with a non-restrictive regulatory administration in place. 
Thus, the strength of the linkage between the proposed player transfer 
system and the evenness of the NPC competition may be even weaker than 
anticipated by the Commission . 
~ Promotion of Player Development. The NZRFU claimed that an even 
competition would increase skill level, particularly because the development 
compensation payment would prevent the selling provincial union 
unreasonably holding on to players, provided the maximum fee is offered. 
Although the Commission accepted that there was some nexus between the 
Regulations and the promotion of player development, the strength of this 
relationship was likely to be weak. 
~ Team stability. Although the transfer period resulted in development of team 
strategies and tactics without disruption caused by mid-season transfer of 
players, this would be likely to occur without the proposed player transfer 
system as the current union-player contracts are typically at least the length 
of a NPC season. 
Direct Benefits claimed by the NZRFU were: 
~ A more attractive NPC competition for spectators and viewers ; and 
~ Enhanced domestic sponsorship, merchandising and broadcasting interest 
and funding. 
Indirect Benefits claimed by the NZRFU were: 
> Greater audience enjoyment of New Zealand international matches; 
> Increased net foreign earnings for the NZRFU from television rights and 
business sponsorships; 
> Saving on overseas marketing expenses for business ; 
67 Above n 2, 81 . 
~ Enhanced exports of New Zealand goods; and 
~ Greater inflow of foreign tourists. 
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The Commission considered these indirect and direct public benefits to be of 
limited size for the following reasons: 
i. The linkage between the claimed benefits and the proposed player transfer 
system was perceived to be weak; 
ii. The claimed benefits were inherently difficult to measure because 
commercial transactions had not yet occurred in the professional rugby 
union environment; and 
iii. The market restrictions imposed by the Regulations were perceived to be 
mild, particularly when compared with the counterfactual. 
Therefore, the Commission gave the claimed benefits little weight. 
E. Balancing 
When evaluating the perceived public benefits and detriments, the Commission 
was faced with a situation where both benefits and detriments were found to be 
of limited size. Thus, the Commission undertook a holistic exercise and stood 
back and looked at the benefits and the detriments in the round. On balance, 
the Commission thought that the public benefits outweighed the ascertainable 
detriments. Accordingly , authorisation to implement the proposed player 
transfer system was granted. 
On appeal, the High Court placed considerable emphasis on the specialised 
expertise of the Commission staff. Additionally, Smellie J stressed the extensive 
evidence produced by the NZRFU and determined that it was open to the 
Commission to conclude that the benefits comfortably outweighed the 
detriments. 
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F. Did the Commerce Commission take the Right Approach? 
In its determination, the Commission unquestionably applied the public benefit 
test in a manner that was consistent with the Commerce Commission's 
guidelines. However, it is submitted that this approach is not necessarily 
consistent with legislative intent. Although the Cabinet review of the Commerce 
Act recommended the amendment of section 3A of the Act to emphasise 
efficiency considerations, this recommendation was never implemented. 
Therefore, notwithstanding that the Commission is required to have regard to 
any efficiencies which result from the practice,68 it does not necessarily follow 
that efficiency considerations are to be the principal element of the analysis. It is 
certainly arguable that when applying the public benefit test, the Commission 
should not necessarily be confined to issues of efficiency. Thus, the public 
benefit test under the Commerce Act should not be restricted so as to exclude 
non-efficiency considerations. It is submitted that this would still accord with the 
underlying premise of the Act of promoting workable competition. However, it 
would involve moving away from a 'pure' Chicago approach towards a populist 
view whereby concepts of fairness, control of illegitimate power, and the 
fostering of distributional values, as well as economic efficiency are taken into 
account. Additionally, this type of analysis removes the need for the Commerce 
Commission to mould any intangible benefits flowing from the promotion of sport 
into an artificial 'efficiency' framework. 69 
The Commission 's decision regarding the NZRFU player transfer arrangements 
also serves to illustrate the inherent difficulties of subjecting professional 
sporting bodies to competition law. As noted above, modern professional 
68 See section 3A of the Commerce Act 1986. 
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sporting leagues place considerable emphasis upon revenue maximisation and 
maintenance of spectator interest in a similar manner to other commercial 
entities. However, the public nature of sport as a cultural activity ensures that 
some sporting issues cannot be easily analysed within the 'efficiency' framework 
of the public benefit test. Although notions of productive and dynamic 
efficiencies can be readily applied to commercial industries where consumers 
are purchasing a commodity, the cooperative nature of a sporting league 
provides a unique subject for analysis. In the NZRFU decision, the Commission 
was required to define the relevant market so as to look upon players as a 
commodity and thus enable analysis within the traditional 'efficiency' framework. 
The approach taken by the Commerce Commission thus necessitated an 
artificial manipulation of the benefits and detriments. 
Additionally, it is a severe inadequacy of the public benefit test under the Act 
that player interests cannot be considered in an open and direct manner. 
Rather, any impact upon player interests must be considered in the context of 
efficiency arguments. The chief justification for this approach is that the 
Commerce Act aims to protect competition not competitors. Thus, a player may 
have personal reasons for desiring to change clubs such as personal 
dissatisfaction with the club or coach, inability to play in the position or team of 
his choice, inability to get exposure for representative selection , or because the 
training timetable is unsuitable. However, these very real detriments may not be 
considered within the context of the authorisation process, as they do not fit 
neatly within the 'public benefit test' in terms of efficiency considerations. 
69 See above n 4 7, 10-11 . 
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VII. THE COMMON LAW RESTRAINT OF TRADE DOCTRINE 
A. Common Law Interface with the Commerce Act 1986 
It is important to distinguish between the application of competition laws under 
the Commerce Act 1986 and the use of contract law in sporting contexts. With 
respect to the latter concept, the common law doctrine of restraint of trade has 
been commonly applied to player contracts. It is notable that the Commerce Act 
does effectively prohibit some contracts in restraint of trade through sections 27 
and 29, which scrutinise contracts, arrangements or understandings that lessen 
competition or contain exclusionary provisions. However, common law restraint 
of trade principles are also expressly preserved under the Commerce Act 1986. 
Section 7(1) states that "[n]othing in this Act limits or affects any rule of law 
relating to restraint of trade not inconsistent with any of the provisions of this 
Act". Thus, the common law doctrine of restraint of trade will apply to restrictive 
arrangements to the extent that it is not inconsistent with the Commerce Act 
1986. A leading text on contract law maintains that it is preferable that contracts 
in restraint of trade, which are illegal under the Commerce Act, be dealt with 
under the Commerce Act.70 However, a situation falling within one of the section 
44 exemptions and therefore outside the jurisdiction of the Commerce Act will be 
exclusively governed by the restraint of trade doctrine. 
It is arguable that if the Commission has jurisdiction to consider a restrictive 
arrangement under the Commerce Act, the common law restraint of trade 
doctrine should not apply, as it would be inconsistent with the application of the 
Commerce Act. Thus, the restraint of trade doctrine could not apply whenever 
the Commission could claim jurisdiction under the Commerce Act, regardless of 
whether authorisation has been granted. However, it is more likely that 
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restraints which have been authorised under the Commerce Act, may also be 
challenged under the restraint of trade doctrine as authorisation only gives 
immunity from action under the Commerce Act. Nonetheless, authorised 
restraints may not be modified under section 8 of the Illegal Contracts Act 1970 
as section 89(5) of the Commerce Act prevents the application of the Illegal 
Contracts Act to any contract which contravenes the Commerce Act, regardless 
of whether an authorisation has been granted or not. 
B. Restraint of Trade in the Sporting Context 
Under the common law doctrine of restraint of trade, an impugned covenant is 
prima facie void as contrary to public policy. 71 However, a restraint may be 
authorised if the restriction is 'reasonable'. Lord Macnaghten provides the 
classic formulation of the test to be applied to such a restriction:72 
All interference with individual liberty of action in trading, and all restraints of trade of 
themselves, if there is nothing more, are contrary to public policy, and, therefore, void. 
That is the general rule. But there are exceptions. Restraints of trade and interference 
with individual liberty of action, may be justified by the special circumstances of a particular 
case. It is a sufficient justification, and indeed, it is the only justification , if the restriction is 
reasonable - reasonable, that is in reference to the interests of the parties concerned and 
reasonable in reference to the public, so framed and so guarded as to afford adequate 
protection to the party in whose favour it is imposed, while at the same time it is in no way 
injurious to the public. 
Thus, the following three requirements must be satisfied before a restraint of 
trade is allowed to stand: 
i. There is a legitimate proprietary interest to be protected;73 
70 JF Burrows, J Finn and SMD Todd (eds) Cheshire and Fifoots Law of Contract (Bed, 
Butterworths, Wellington, 1992) 361. 
71 Colgate v Bache/er (1602) Cro Eliz 872. 
72 Nordenfelt v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co Ltd [1894] AC 535, 565. 
73 Stenhouse Australia Ltd v Phillips [1974] 1 All ER 117, 122. 
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ii. The restraint is reasonable in the interests of all parties; and 
iii. The restraint is in the public interest. 
In Esso Petroleum Co Ltdv Harper's Garage Ltd,74 Lord Pearce usefully distilled 
these grounds into one broad principle:75 
There is not, as some cases seem to suggest, a separation between what is reasonable on 
grounds of public policy and what is reasonable as between the parties. There is one 
broad question: is it in the interests of the community that the restraint should, as between 
the parties, be held to be reasonable and enforceable. 
Whether a restraint is reasonable is a question of law and the onus of proving 
the restriction is reasonable lies on the party seeking to uphold the restraint. 76 In 
the sporting context, the administrative body or affiliated clubs will generally be 
seeking to enforce the restraint. 
Numerous cases have dealt with the different forms of regulation and discipline 
imposed on players within sports leagues.77 It is notable that the restraint of 
trade doctrine is not limited to a contractual relationship to which the player is a 
party.78 Thus, the plaintiff need not show that the rules of the particular league 
which he impugns, constitute a contract between him and that league. 
Regardless of their form, the rules generally have the common effect of 
restricting the rights of the player to negotiate and contract with the team of their 
choice and in some cases preventing players from exercising their trade 
altogether. Such rules stem from the need to maintain a marketable sporting 
competition . The courts have recognised this aim as a legitimate function of any 
74 [1968] AC 269. 
75 Above n 74, 324. 
76 Buckley v Tutty (1971) 125 CLR 353, 377. 
77 Eastham v Newcastle United Football Club Ltd [1964] Ch 413 (transfer and retain) ; Blackler v 
New Zealand Rugby Football League [1968] NZLR 547 (clearance) ; Buckley v Tutty (1971) 125 
CLR 353 (transfer and retain); Adamson v West Perth Football Club (1979) 27 ALR 475 (zoning 
and clearance) . 
76 Foschini v Victorian Football League Unreported, 15 April 1983, Supreme Court of Victoria, 16. 
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sporting administration. In Buckley v Tutty,79 the High Court of Australia found 
that it was a legitimate object of the League and the affiliated clubs to aim to 
provide a system that would ensure sufficient stability of membership and would 
prevent the stronger clubs obtaining all the 'best' players. Thus, evenness of 
competition was recognised as a justifiable interest of the League:80 
It is a legitimate object of the League and of the district clubs to ensure that the teams 
fielded in the competitions are as strong and well matched as possible, for in that way the 
support of the public will be attracted and maintained, and players will be afforded the best 
opportunity of developing and displaying their skill. It is therefore legitimate to aim to 
provide a system that will ensure sufficient stability of membership to permit those who play 
for a club to be trained as a team and to develop a team spirit, and that will prevent the 
stronger clubs obtaining all the best players, thus leaving the weaker clubs with teams that 
are unable effectively to compete with their stronger opponents ... It may nevertheless be 
reasonable to lay down some qualifications for membership of a club, or to impose some 
restrictions on the transfer of professional players from one club to another or on the extent 
to which a club may entice players away from another club. 
Thus, the Australian High Court acknowledged that some element of restraint 
upon professional players was reasonable as it would ensure club stability, well-
matched competition and public support.81 However, the Court concluded that 
the rigidity of the rules made them excessive and were invalid as an 
unreasonable restraint of trade. 
In Adamson v New South Wales Rugby League Ltd,82 the primary issue was 
whether the restraint went no further than was reasonably necessary to protect 
the legitimate interests of those who had imposed it. Accordingly, three 
'legitimate' interests were identified as being protected by the internal draft: 
i. Improving competitive equality between the teams; 
79 Above n 76. 
so Above 76, 377. 
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ii. Maintaining the financial viability of the clubs; and 
iii. The retention of players by the clubs by preventing mid-season transfers. 
Firstly, the Court asked whether there was any evidence that the protectable 
interests of the League might be jeopardised if the restraint was not in place. It 
was established that before the introduction of the internal draft the League was 
prospering financially and the competition was strong and evenly matched.83 
Thus, any danger to the League's interests was not immediate or significant. 
Secondly, the Court asked whether there were other means of protecting the 
legitimate interests of the League. The Court was of the view that there were 
other ways of securing these advantages for the competition which would not 
unnecessarily restrain the players in choosing the club they wished to play for. 
Additionally, it was held that a salary cap alone would be sufficient to ensure the 
financial viability of the League.84 
As a whole, sporting drafts have not been treated kindly by the courts, 
notwithstanding frequent judicial acknowledgments that sports administrative 
bodies have a legitimate interest in preserving the evenness of the league. It is 
likely that this result stems from the ability of an individual player to show a clear 
restraint on his or her freedom whereas the sporting organisation can only 
present a philosophical theory, which cannot be proved or quantified with any 
degree of certainty or specificity.85 The liberty of the subject to conduct his 
business as he sees fit seems to be of paramount importance under the restraint 
of trade doctrine. Indeed, it appears to be virtually inviolable. 
81 Above n 76, 377. 
82 Above n 12. 
83 Above n 12, 370. 
84 Above n 12, 349-50. 
85 W Pengilley "Restraint of Trade and Antitrust: A Pigskin Review Post Super League" A paper 
presented at the 1997 Annual Workshop of the Competition Law and Policy Institute of New 
Zealand, Christchurch, New Zealand, 1-3 August 1997, 16. 
47 
C. Player Interests and Other Social Considerations 
Adamson v New South Wales Rugby League Ltc/36 was also significant in terms 
of player interests. Wilcox J held that although the primary question would 
always be the extent of the League's need for protection, the Court must 
consider the effect of the restraint upon the player.87 He maintained that the 
notion of 'reasonableness' necessarily involves the balancing of competing 
interests and in sports league cases, "the courts have always considered the 
effect of the agreement upon the players".88 Accordingly, the restraint was only 
enforceable if it did "no more than reasonably protect the interests of the 
respondents [the League and affiliated clubs], having regard to the interests of 
the players".89 The restraint was held to be unenforceable as the rules infringed 
the freedom and interests of the players in an excessive way while doing little to 
protect the interests of the League. Additionally, the restrictions were contrary to 
the common law principle that people are entitled to practice their trade as and 
where they wished, to exercise and develop their skills as they saw best and to 
make their own decisions as to their employment and lifestyle. 
It is also important to note the distinction made by Gummow J between cases of 
contractual restraint and those of involuntary restraint by a combination.90 This 
distinction is fundamental. Accordingly, where restrictions are imposed by a 
contract which is freely entered into, there is an opportunity for the parties to 
negotiate and if an agreement is reached through fair bargaining, a court will not 
readily hold the restraint to be unreasonable as between the parties.91 However, 
where the restraint is involuntary and imposed by a combination, there should 
86 Above n 12. 
87 Above n 12, 341 . 
88 Above n 12, 341 . 
89 Above n 12, 356. 
90 Above n 12, 363. 
91 This accords with the approach taken in Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper's Garage Ltd [1968] 
AC 269. 
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be a heavy burden on the restraining party to prove that it should be 
enforceable. 
In the sporting context, the restraint of trade doctrine has been characterised by 
non-economic considerations in determining whether sports-related restraints 
are 'reasonable' in the public interest. Under the common law, courts have been 
able to recognise and consider the public interests of fostering talent and 
supporting all levels of a sport. In Blackler v New Zealand Rugby Football 
League,92 North P considered the need to maintain national standards in rugby 
league when considering whether a contractual restraint of trade was 
reasonable and in the public interest. This case concerned the validity of a rule 
that a representative player in New Zealand would not be given clearance to 
play in the Australian professional league until he had represented his country 
for five years. While the public interest in avoiding a 'player drain ' across the 
Tasman was recognised, the clearance rule was considered to be excessively 
drastic and therefore an unreasonable restraint. In Hall v Victorian Football 
League,93 Murray J acknowledged that a club with control of a particular area 
could impose certain limitations as it supported all levels of football in the area 
and thus served the public interest of fostering talent and creating supporter 
loyalties. 
On an assessment of the application of the restraint of trade doctrine to sporting 
bodies, it seems evident that the courts have included considerations of social 
and community benefits when determining whether a restraint should be 
affirmed in the public interest. The common law doctrine utilises standards that 
enable the restraint to be judged by regard to its commercial context, with 
92 [1968] NZLR 547. 
93 [1982] VR 64. 
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consideration being accorded both to the interests of the parties involved and to 
the interest of the public in allowing the restraint. This emphasis on 
consideration of community interests differs from the public benefit test adopted 
in the Commerce Act 1986, which focuses on economic considerations of 
efficiency and free competition. Unlike antitrust law, restraint of trade decisions 
tend not to reflect efficiency considerations. Rather, the underlying foundation 
reflects the lawyer's traditional consideration of the notions of equity and 
fairness. This is forcefully illustrated in Adamson v New South Wales Rugby 
League LtcP4 where Wilcox J commented on the role of the League's Appellate 
Tribunal95 set up to determine personal hardship exemptions:96 
[H]ow, in a free society, can anyone justify a regime which requires a player to subm it 
... intensely personal decisions to determination by others ... On the view I take, the internal 
draft rules do very little to protect the interests of the [players]. They do much to infringe 
the freedom and the interests, economic and non-economic, of the players. 
In contrast to the public benefit test in the Commerce Act, common law courts 
using the restraint of trade doctrine have placed considerable emphasis on the 
individual interests of the players including economic, intangible, personal and 
social matters. The overriding consideration seems to be the 'freedom' of the 
individual, which is historically a common law notion. This is very different from 
evaluating competition in a market. In the context of the Commerce Act, the 
Commission and the courts are quite prepared to sacrifice individual freedom in 
the interests of efficiency. However, the common law courts seem more eager 
to tolerate some inefficiency in order to preserve traditionally valued liberties. 
Additionally, section 7(3) of the Commerce Act provides that no rule of law with 
respect to restraint of trade affects the interpretation of any of the provisions in 
94 Above n 12. 
95 Similar to the Player Review Committee set up under the NZRFU Regulations to deal with 
extraordinary and/or compelling changes in a player's circumstances. 
96 Above n 12, 355-356. 
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the Act. Thus, considerations such as 'interests of the parties' and 'interests of 
the public' which are relevant to the determination of whether a restraint of trade 
is reasonable at common law, will be not be relevant in the context of the public 
benefit test as considered under the authorisation procedure in the Commerce 
Act. Given the different policy objectives that are sought to be fulfilled by the 
different legal techniques taken in the common law and the Commerce Act, it is 
therefore not surprising that the two approaches are inconsistent and somewhat 
co ntrad icto ry. 
VIII. APPLICATION OF THE COMMON LAW RESTRAINT OF TRADE 
DOCTRINE TO THE NZRFU ARRANGEMENTS 
As noted above, section 7(1) of the Commerce Act presumes the continuance of 
the common law restraint of trade doctrine. Thus, although the NZRFU player 
transfer arrangements have been authorised under the Commerce Act, the 
common law doctrine of restraint of trade is still relevant. 
In its determination, the Commission commented that:97 
Whilst the regulations are relatively mild compared with overseas labour market controls, it 
seems likely that they will have some effect, in terms of avoiding the excesses which might 
eventuate in a free market where provincial unions could compete for players to stay one 
step ahead of the others. 
The implication flowing from this statement is that if the restrictions imposed 
were more draconian, the public benefit flowing from them would be higher. 
However, if this was to occur, the NZRFU runs the risk of infringing upon the 
freedom of the players to an unreasonable extent. In a paper presented at the 
97 Above n 2, 81. 
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1997 Annual Workshop of the Competition Law and Policy Institute of New 
Zealand, Warren Pengilley concludes that:98 
[T]he New Zealand Rugby Union was extremely wise to keep its rules relative ly non-
violative of the individual player's freedom even if, as the Commerce Commission 
intimates, this may bring about less economic efficiency. 
He considers that it was significant that the NZRFU could unashamedly assert 
that "no player can be prevented from transferring by his [provincial] union" in 
order to avoid being classed as an unreasonable restriction under the common 
law restraint of trade doctrine. The Commission also considered it to be an 
important aspect of the arrangements that no player could be compelled to 
transfer from one provincial union to another against his wishes and that there 
was provision for "above quota" transfers if there were an extraordinary and/or 
compelling change in a player's personal services. However, it is moderately 
easy to envisage a situation whereby a player could be prevented from 
transferring by his union. This would occur if the acquiring union does not wish 
to pay the maximum Development Compensation Payment and the selling union 
refuses to accept a lower or nil fee, so that the player is effectively prevented 
from transferring by his union. The nature of this restriction is aggravated by the 
fact that uncertainty exists in this new professional environment as to the 
willingness of provincial unions to pay the maximum transfer fee. During the 
authorisation process, some unions suggested that the maximum payments 
were excessive, while others submitted that the stipulated amounts were 
reasonable. Thus, the restrictive nature of the player transfer system may 
equate to an unreasonable restraint of trade. Moreover, Adamson v New South 
Wales Rugby League99 suggests that the existence of an appeal authority will 
98 Above n 85, 70. 
99 Above n 12. 
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not be sufficient to convert an unreasonable restraint of trade into a reasonable 
one. 
Within the restraint of trade context, the New Zealand High Court has found it 
decisive that similarly restraining League rules were imposed upon the player 
rather than conceived through a process of negotiation.100 Similarly, in the 
context of professional boxing , the High Court in Watson v Prager stated:101 
I do not doubt the necessity, in the interests of professional boxers, of the board exercising 
careful regulatory control over the contents of boxer-manager contracts. Enlightened 
paternalism, however, may be all very well in its way, but carries unden iable dangers. 
Omniscience is not an invariable companion of omnipotence, and the board's opinion as to 
the scope of the restrictions to be imposed on a boxer in a boxer-management agreement 
is not necessarily right. 
Although Watson addressed the restraint of trade issue in the context of boxing, 
the reasoning is equally applicable to other professional sports. Throughout the 
authorisation process, the RUPA repeatedly emphasised the lack of consultation 
with the players with a view to devising an appropriate transfer system. 
Although this point was not specifically addressed by the Commission, the 
NZRFU produced no evidence of negotiation with individual players or player 
organisations. However, it was common ground that extensive consultation and 
cooperation had taken place with the provincial unions and 'other interested 
parties'. It seems somewhat ironic the players were considered to be outside 
the definition of interested parties. 
It is also to be noted that the NZRFU justified the imposition of maximum 
transfer fees as compensation for the investment in the player by the 
10° Kemp v New Zealand Rugby Football League [1989) 3 NZLR 463. 
101 [1991] 3 All ER 487. 
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transferring club. Such justification was considered by the Australian High Court 
in Buckley v Tutty to be insufficient to make the practice acceptable.102 The 
Court stated:103 
The transfer fee not only may prevent a player from reaping the financial rewards of his 
own skill but it may impede him in obtaining new employment. It is no answer to say that 
the transfer fee may be fixed by reference to what it cost the club to obtain another player 
equally skilful, for this is only another way of saying that an employer may restrain an 
employee from working elsewhere unless he is compensated for the loss of his services. 
In this respect also the restraint goes further than is necessary to protect the reasonable 
interest of the League and its members. 
Should a New Zealand court take this approach, it is unlikely that the NZRFU 
transfer fee will be considered to be reasonable under the restraint of trade 
doctrine. It is certainly arguable that the common law courts would regard the 
somewhat modest restraints as an unreasonable infringement upon the civil 
rights of rugby players and may regard the public benefit as unlikely to be 
delivered. However, it is also possible that the New Zealand judiciary would 
take a more liberal approach to the classification of the NZRFU player transfer 
system and find that the regulation or limitation of the transfer fees was 
necessitated in order to prevent the use of unreasonably high fees and thus 
undermine a player's marketability. 
102 Above n 76. 
103 Above n 76, 378. 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
The NZRFU player transfer arrangements raise the fundamental issue of the 
balance of interests between the sportsperson and the ruling sports 
organisation. This same issue arises in the employment law context and has 
been dealt with by the application of the common law restraint of trade doctrine. 
Historically, this common law doctrine has provided an effective means to 
challenge practices used to control player marketability. In Australia, the 
restraint of trade doctrine has been frequently utilised by the courts in order to 
strike down restrictions which unfairly disadvantage players. However, the 
Commerce Commission's claim to jurisdiction in the context of the NZRFU's 
proposed player transfer arrangements means that the ramifications of 
competition law must now be considered in the professional sporting 
environment. Thus, any professional sporting organisation seeking to impose 
restrictions upon players must now ensure they are not acting in contravention 
of the Commerce Act, and also ensure that any restriction upon players is 
reasonable within the common law restraint of trade doctrine. Following the 
NZRFU decision, sporting bodies may be required to walk the tightrope between 
these two potential causes of action , both of which are equally fatal to the 
implementation of any restrictive player arrangements. Presumably, the 
Commerce Commission would have preferred that the NZRFU implemented a 
more restrictive arrangement, as it would have had a greater impact upon public 
benefits in terms of efficiency. However, the more regimented the arrangement, 
the more likely that it would offend against the restraint of trade doctrine as an 
unreasonable restriction. 104 Accordingly, any further player restraints in the 
sporting arena would be well advised to follow the lead of the NZRFU and 
104 Indeed, a highly restrictive arrangement may result in such anticompetitive effect that the pub lic 
benefit is seen to be insufficient to outweigh the detriments under the Commerce Act. 
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compromise between competing objectives in order to comply both with 
competition law and with common law restraint of trade law. 
The Commerce Commission's finding that they had jurisdiction over the NZRFU 
player transfer arrangements resulted in a rather artificial approach to market 
definition. For instance, the formulation of a market for the rights to player 
services avoided the need to consider the 'contract of service' exemption in 
section 2(1) of the Commerce Act. However, regardless of the market adopted 
for competition analysis, the exemptions in section 44 should have ensured that 
the Commerce Act does not apply to the player transfer arrangements. 
Unfortunately, the Commission neglected to consider sections 44(1 )(c) and 
44(1 )(f) and effectively claimed jurisdiction over the player transfer 
arrangements notwithstanding contrary legislative intent. 
Thus, the NZRFU decision has far-reaching consequences for professional 
sporting organisations, affiliated clubs and contracted players. Traditionally, the 
restraint of trade doctrine provided an avenue for player redress under 
established and well-developed principles which sought to protect legal 
freedoms. The potential application of the Commerce Act means that restrictive 
player arrangements will now be constrained to an efficiency framework under 
the public benefit test. Arguably, this type of efficiency analysis is unsuited to 
restrictive arrangements in the sporting arena where social and moral 
considerations are fundamental and player interests can be affected in a 
significant manner. The Commission 's narrow interpretation of the public benefit 
test ensures that these non-economic considerations will be given little weight or 
disregarded altogether. 
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APPENDIX A 
TRANSFER MAXIMUM MAXIMUM NUMBER OF PLAYERS TO 
BANDS DEVELOPMENT BE TRANSFERRED TO AN 
COMPENSATION AFFILIATED UNION 
PAYMENT 
$ 
ALL BLACKS 
Star 125,000 ) 
Established 75,000 ) 1 
Current 50,000 ) 3 
ALL BLACKS 
Former 40,000 ) 2 
RUGBY SUPER 12 30,000 ) 
SENIOR A NPC 
151 Div 20,000 2 
2nd Div 15,000 2 
3rd Div 10,000 2 
NPC 
DEVELOPMENT 
151 Div 5,000 2 4 
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